But for now, as Denis Volkov, the director of the Levada Center, an independent polling agency, told me, survey data suggest that Russians have a more positive outlook for their country than in any previous period of Putinâs Presidency. The share of Russians who report being able to make discretionary purchases, such as televisions and household appliances, is growing. The portion of respondents who think Russiaâs economic prospects will continue to improve in the next five years has risen by some thirty-five percentage points since 2022. Even the number of those who said that the distribution of wealth has become more equitable rose by a record percentage. âIf you look at the data,â Volkov said, âyouâre left with the feeling that people believe theyâve never lived so well.â
The darker aspects of the war, including the deaths of tens of thousands of soldiers, are largely kept private, dealt with individually, out of the public sphere. The Kremlin has promised to send payments of five million rubles, around fifty-five thousand U.S. dollars, to the families of those killed in actionâa significant sum, especially in the poorer regions from which most of Russiaâs recruits are drawn. In a stage-managed meeting with mothers of Russian soldiers, Putin revealed his own attitude toward the countryâs war dead. âSome people die of vodka, and their lives go unnoticed,â he told a woman whose son was killed in Luhansk. âBut your son really lived and achieved his goal. He didnât die in vain.â
Putin, for his part, sees himself not as an autocrat holding the country hostage but as a steward of Russiaâs historical destiny. After decades in power, Putinâs logic functions as a tautology, a closed loop in which he never has to question or doubt the virtue of his political choices. As he sees it, he acts in the nationâs interests and therefore has the nationâs support; he has the right to rule however he wants because, in fact, he is serving and protecting the state. âOf course, thatâs a very convenient position for Putin,â Abbas Gallyamov, a former speechwriter for Putin who is now a Putin critic, told me. âSeeing as that, by this point, he is the state.â
Still, in the past few months, Russia has seen two mass-scale, unscripted political events and, tellingly, neither was in support of Putin or the war. The first came in January, when lines of people spontaneously appeared across the country to provide their signatures in support of the candidacy of Boris Nadezhdin, a milquetoast, unthreatening, and unknown liberal politician. Nadezhdin made ending the âspecial military operationâ the centerpiece of his campaign and called for freeing political prisoners. The Kremlin ultimately refused to put him on the Presidential ballotâa sign that it was rattled by images of people standing in the freezing cold to register their support for an alternative to Putin. According to reporting by Meduza, a Russian news outlet based abroad, internal Kremlin metrics forecast that Nadezhdin would have won as much as ten per cent of the vote. That would have clashed with Putinâs rhetoric of a unified country. A source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that such an outcome would âsuddenly give the impression that a sizable share of the population is eager for the special military operation to end.â
The second event was Navalnyâs funeral. Navalny was not necessarily popular in an electoral sense. His approval rating in Russia peaked at twenty per cent, in 2021, shortly after he was poisoned by Kremlin agents. But he had a powerful resonance in Russian society. With his plainspoken criticism of official corruption, his sense of humor, and his remarkable lack of fear, he became an avatar for an alternative, more optimistic future. He built a nationwide network of field offices and consistently drew thousands to protests across the country. âAutocracies like Russiaâs donât like the idea of progress,â Ekaterina Schulmann, a Russian political scientist based in Berlin, told me. âThey are intently focussed on the past, maintain a cult of history, and use these ideas to try and keep the present forever.â Navalny represented the opposite, which made his existence unbearable to the state. âHis entire stance centered on how tomorrow can be different from today if only we all follow some consistent action,â Schulmann said.
On March 1st, crowds lined a street in Moscow as the hearse carrying Navalnyâs body drove past. Thousands more flocked to Borisovsky Cemetery, where they covered Navalnyâs grave in a bulging mound of flowers. People chanted âRussia without Putin,â âNo to war,â and even âUkrainians are good peopleââa remarkable display of civic courage given that, during the past two years, police have arrested people holding posters with asterisks in place of the words âNo war,â and even those with blank posters with no words at all. Analysis of the Moscow metro system by Mediazona, an independent news site, showed a surge of twenty-seven thousand passengers to the station nearest to the cemetery. I spoke to a friend who had attended. âWe hadnât been among so many people who think like us in years,â the friend said. âThe occasion was terrible, but the mood felt energized.â
The Russian investigative site Proekt, which the Russian state has labelled âundesirable,â recently tallied the number of people who have faced criminal prosecution in politically motivated cases in the course of Putinâs current six-year Presidential term. It was more than ten thousand, surpassing the comparable figures under the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. âIn addition to the widely discussed repression of oppositionists and anti-war activists, Russia has a system of social pressure where citizens are severely punished for the most insignificant misdemeanors,â the Proekt report said. Still, the current repressions are tough enough for everyone to get the message, but not so tough that they infringe on the publicâs sense of normalcy. Aleksei Miniailo, an activist and co-founder of a sociological research project called Chronicles, who has chosen to remain in Moscow, told me, âIf these were really Stalinist times, I would have been shot a year ago.â He went on, âThis regime relies on one per cent repressions, ninety-nine per cent propaganda.â
One should not confuse the absence of dissent with heartfelt support. The Kremlin cannot fill stadiums with rabid, committed supporters. (It can bus them in or otherwise twist the arms of state employees, but genuine passion is exceedingly hard to muster.) Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, referenced Putinâs annual state-of-the-nation address from late February, during which he spoke of people who âsend letters and parcels, warm clothes, and camouflage nets to the front; they donate money from their savings.â Putin, she said, needs to see the war not as something he alone launchedâas is the caseâbut as an endeavor supported and demanded by the people. Stanovaya quoted the Soviet battle hymn, âSacred War,â known for its opening line: âArise great country!â But now, Stanovaya said, âThe country doesnât feel like rising.â
Last fall, in a moment of rare candor, Valery Fedorov, the head of a state-run polling agency, admitted that the so-called party of warâhawks who advocate for victory at any priceârepresents only ten to fifteen per cent of society. âThe majority of Russians do not demand to take Kyiv or Odesa,â he said. âThey donât enjoy the fighting. If it were up to them, they would not have started a military operation, but since the situation has already developed this way, then we must win.â This is not quite opposition to the war, but itâs certainly something far less than enthusiasm for it.
Putin has largely accepted this reality. His government has set out to rewrite school history textbooks to portray Russia as perpetually defending itself against outside enemies and to link the war in Ukraine to the Soviet Unionâs victory in the Second World War. Now Russian troops are fighting for âgoodness and truthâ just like their grandfathers. But, on the whole, as Volkov, of the Levada Center, put it, âThe state lets people live as they want.â Putin has attempted to calm fears of another mass-mobilization order. âThere is no such need,â he said last summer. If people are so moved, as he noted, to sew camouflage nets for the soldiers at the front, the state will celebrate their efforts. But if people want to busy themselves with childrenâs playgroups and Moscow restaurantsâRemchukov, the newspaper publisher, spoke of new supply chains that provide exquisite crab legs and sea urchins from Murmansk, on the Barents Seaâthatâs fine, too.
There is no great strategy or vision; unlike the ideology of the Soviet period, Putinism offers no sweeping values against which particular actions or policies can be measured. This fact, along with Putinâs disinterest in the nitty-gritty of governance, means there is ever more room for improvisation and freelancing at all levels of the state apparatus. Many high-profile arrests and criminal cases are launched without Putinâs direct awarenessâthe F.S.B. long ago received carte blanche to act as it pleases. Last fall, Putin ended up in a mildly awkward position when regional governments moved to restrict abortion rights and Putin, aware of the general discomfort in society with such restrictions, stepped in to block them.