“Turkey made the assessment that the potential additional benefits they could gain by prolonging the process were no longer worth the pressure that Turkey would need to face,” said Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, the director of the Ankara office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
The shift, he said, also appeared to be part of an effort by Mr. Erdogan to move Turkey away from Russia and toward the West. That would be significant, if sustained, he said.
“Turkey and Russia did not and do not have a love affair,” Mr. Unluhisarcikli said. Instead, they engage in “competitive cooperation,” he said, and tend to get closer when Turkey feels distant from the West.
As indications of Mr. Erdogan distancing Turkey from Russia, he cited Turkey’s decision to allow fighters from Ukraine’s Azov Regiment to return to Ukraine from Turkey last weekend, angering Russia, as did Mr. Erdogan’s failure to stand unambiguously by Mr. Putin as Wagner mercenary forces marched toward Moscow in June.
“Erdogan might have assessed that putting all the eggs in Putin’s basket is not a good idea,” he said.
On the flip side, allowing Sweden into NATO and working out the F-16 agreement could allow Mr. Erdogan to warm up what has been a chilly relationship with Washington.
Mr. Biden has kept Mr. Erdogan at arm’s length since he entered the White House. During his electoral campaign, he characterized Mr. Erdogan as anti-democratic and vowed to support the Turkish opposition. Mr. Erdogan, for his part, had cordial relations with former President Donald J. Trump.
Mr. Biden and Mr. Erdogan have previously met during Mr. Biden’s presidency, but Mr. Biden is the first U.S. president not to host Mr. Erdogan in the White House since the Turkish leader began his national political career in 2002.
Gulsin Harman contributed reporting.
